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Brief of Defendants-Respondents 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by the administrator of a deceased 
workman to recover life insurance and accidental death 
benefits claimed to be due under a group insurance 
program. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOlVER COURT 
This action was originally filed in the District 
Court of Cache County, but upon motion of defendants 
for a change of venue was transferred to the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. Approximately three and 
one-half years after the complaint was filed, defendant 
Skyline Construction Company moved to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to prosecute or in the alternative 
for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, both plain-
tiff and the other defendants moved for summary judg-
ment. Upon the hearing of such motions, defendant 
Skyline Construction Company's motion for summary 
judgment was granted and the other motions were taken 
under advisement, the parties being requested to file 
memorandums in support of their motions. After sub-
mission of such memorandums, the motion of the other 
defendants for summary judgment was granted and 
the motion of plaintiff was denied. Thereafter, plain-
tiff filed what was denominated "motion to vacate 
judgment and to enter conforming judgment," which, 
after hearing, was denied. The notice of appeal was 
filed one month after the denial of the latter motion 
but several months after the entry of the order granting 
the summary judgment in favor of the other defendants 
(respondents herein). No appeal has been taken from 
the order granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendant Skyline Construction Company. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
L cspondents seek affirmance of the summary judg-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this action are relatively simple and 
are not in dispute as to any material matter, if at all. 
Plaintiff's intestate, Russell L. Marriot, became em-
ployed as an operating engineer by Skyline Construc-
tio11 Company on August 1, 1964. He worked as such 
for 198 hours in August and 104 hours in September, 
1Ufi4 ( R. 49-54). On September 17, 1964, he was killed 
when the crane he was operating came in contact with 
a high voltage line ( R. 50) . 
lly an agreement dated June 1, 1956, between the 
Operating Engineer's Local Union #3 of the Inter-
ua lional Union of Opera ting Engineers and various 
employers in the construction industry the "Operating 
Engineer's Trust Fund for Utah" was created (R. 78-
88) . Pursuant to such agreement, the trustees thereof 
initiated a group insurance program, under which de-
fendant Pacific National Life Insurance Company was 
insurer for the life insurance benefits and defendant 
Continental Casualty Company was insurer for the 
other benefits provided under the program (R. 91). 
The premiums were paid by the various employers 
(under a collective bargaining agreement with the 
union) based upon the number of hours worked by 
3 
eligible employees during the preceding month ( R. 
53-54). 
As an employee became insured for group 
under the program, a booklet describing the insuring 
agreements was issued to him and a "Certificate of 
Coverage" was affixed to the booklet (R. 91). The 
Certificate-Booklet contains the following language 
(R. 91, p. 3): 
"The insurance benefits and all of the provi-
sions applicable to the persons insured are de-
scribed in this booklet and are effective only if 
the person is eligible for the insurance, becomes 
insured and remains insured in accordance with 
the provisions of the policies. 'Vhen the Certifi-
cate of Coverage is issued as evidence of the in-
surance provided and is affixed as provided 
above, this booklet becomes the individual's Cer-
tificate-Booklet." (Emphasis added). 
The Certificate-Booklet, as well as the master poli-
cies (R. 75) contains the following provision (R. 91, 
p. 5): 
"The initial eligibility requirements of the plan 
provide that an employee must work for one or 
more contributing employers at least 300 hours 
in a period of three or less consecutive calendar 
months. Each employee who meets this require-
ment (herein referred to as a member) shall first 
become insured on the first of the second calendar 
month next following such period." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Under a section entitled "When Insurance Be-
comes Effective" the Certificate-Booklet continues (R. 
91, p. 6): 
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"Employees: Your insurance under this Plan 
becomes effective on the date you are eligible ac-
.. ordi1.!g to the rules described on the previous 
page. 
"Qualification. If you are not in active regular 
employment, on account of injury or sickness, 
on the date your insurance would become effec-
tive as indicated above, your insurance will be-
come effective on the date you return to full-
time work or a n1ila bility for work; except that if 
you become disabled while actively at work be-
tween the date on which you complete the neces-
sary hours for eligibility and the date your eligi-
bility actually begins, your insurance will take 
effect as indicated above." 
\\'bile nut necessary to support the trial court's 
judgment, it should be noted that at the time of his 
death, )Ir. )larriot was not a member of the Operating 
J•:ugiuccr's Union as he had failed to pay all of the 
iuitiation fee and his application was forfeited (R. 40) . 
. After )larriot's death, claim was made for 
of a $2,000.00 life insurance benefit and a 
accidental death benefit. The claim was de-
nied hy the trustees upon the basis that Mr. l\Iarriot 
had never become insured under the program. 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGU-
Ol'S TEIL\IS OF THE INSURANCE CON-
TRACT, :\IR :\IARRIOT HAD NOT BECOME 
IXSCRED AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH 
5 
AND \VAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BEN.K 
FITS CLAIMED. 
There is no dispute between the parties over th.: 
fact that Mr. Marriot did not complete 300 hours as 
an operating engineer for a contributing employe1 
until the middle of September, 1964. Thus, he would 
not have become insured until November 1, 1964, and 
was not covered on September 17, 1964, the date of 
his death. It is a fundamental principle of insurance 
law that when parties to an insurance contract have 
made an agreement as to when the coverage is to become 
effective, such agreement, in the absence of uncertainty 
or ambiguity, is controlling. The principle is stated 
in Couch on Insurance, 2d §39 :54, page 467, as follows: 
"The parties to a contract of insurance may 
agree as to when and under what circumstances 
and conditions the contract shall go into effect, 
and unless there is uncertainty or ambiguity, the 
insurance contract speaks for itself as to its eff ec-
tive date. 
"The effective date of the contract of insurance 
may be specified in the policy as the date of issu-
ance or a date prior or subsequent thereto, or 
before or after delivery. In the absence of statu-
tory prohibition the policy may become effective 
at once or prior to issuance thereof, or in futuro. 
"Since the insurance contract, as in the case 
of any other contract, is to be interpreted to give 
effect to the agreement of the parties, it follows 
that the time which they have specified in the 
policy as the effective date thereof is binding 
upon them." 
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This court has applied that principle on several 
uccasions. For example, in Jones v. New Yark Life In-
• 1: rr1 n ce ('1,mpanu, 69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200 (1927), 
it said: 
"It was within the rights of, and was compe-
tent for, the parties to provide in the application 
under what conditions and at what time the policy 
should become effective and binding. Sterling v. 
Lodge, 28 Utah 505, 80 Pac. 375; \Vhite v. 
:\Ietropolitan Life Insurance Co., 63 Utah 272, 
224 Pac. 1106. It is not, however, as we under-
stand appellant's argument, seriously contended 
that these provisions are not binding upon the 
insured." 
Rejecting an argument that there had been a waiver 
Ly the insurer, of the provisions as to when the contract 
.1hould go into effect, the court continued: 
"'Ve are not here dealing with the claim of 
waiver of the terms of an existing contract. The 
controlling question is, rather, whether there 
was in fact a contract in effect at the date of 
death of the insured. The conditions specifically 
stipulated in the application are that no con-
tract of insurance should come into existence 
until the policy was delivered to the insured and 
the first premium paid, and, further, that the 
insured had not prior to delivery of the policy 
consulted a physician. 
* * * 
"The district court's order protects the re-
spondent company in the rights reserved to it in 
the application by the insured, and does not deny 
to appellant any relief that she can rightfully 
7 
claim under the wording of the application and 
the proven facts in this case." 
More recently, the United States Court of 
for the Tenth Circuit, applying Utah law, came to a 
similar conclusion. M of rad v. New York Life ln.Yurance 
Company, 206 F.2d 491 (1953). It was held that the 
insurance policy had not become effective, although the 
first monthly premium had been paid and the applica-
tion was written to take effect as of its date, when speci-
fied conditions had not occurred prior to the applicant's 
death. The court stated: 
"But, 'A contract of insurance rests upon and 
is controlled by the same principles of law ap-
plicable to any other contract. What the con-
tracting parties intended, mutually agreed to 
and their minds met upon, is the measure of their 
obligations (citing cases) . And if the intentions 
of the parties are clear from an examination of 
the contractual documents, this court will not 
rewrite the contract. 
* * * * 
"The application for the policy provided that 
the insurance policy should be dated as of the 
date of the application.' It with within the rights 
of, and was competent for, the parties to provide 
in the application under what conditions and at 
what time the policy should become effective and 
binding. Jones v. New Lork Life Insurance 
Comnany, 1927, 69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200, 
202.'t 
Even where a policy has been issued, the parties 
to the contract may agree that the insurance will not 
8 
lake dl LCi: until ihe fulfillment of certain con<litiuu;,. 
ul'i1 .lll agreement is binding upon the parties. 111 
ti11 lnsuranee, :Zcl s:JU:9li p. 500, it is stated: 
"The parties may agree to delay the effeetiYe 
date of the by providing that it must be 
in force for a specified period, such a'.> one month, 
IJefore the risk attaches. So, a life insurance 
policy may provide that there shall be no liability 
unless the insure<l lives a specified length of time 
after issuance of the policy. Similarly, it may 
be expressly proYided in life, health, and acci-
dent insurance policies that no liability shall 
attach in eertain cases unless the cause of the dis-
ability upon whieh the elaim for reco\·ery is based 
sltall arise after the policy has been in force for 
a speeifiecl length of time." 
I l further stated hy Couch that a loss sustained dur-
i11µ; the delay perio<l specified in the policy is not covered 
( Coud1 on lnsur:mce, :Zd page 500): 
"\ Vhere a life insurance policy must have been 
issued and in existence for a year before the risk 
attaches, there is no recovery for the death oi 
the insured within that year. A policy which is 
not to be effective until June I does not cover 
disability during although the application 
shows no disability in April when the insured 
was eligible for insurance without evidence of 
insura bility. And where, in order to recover dis-
ability bc1;efits, the policy must have been in 
force for one year prior to the accident, disability 
for an aceident which occurred prior to midnight 
of the last <late of the policy year is not covered." 
The fact that the contract is under a group policy 
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and evidenced by a Certificate-Booklet rather than a 
policy does not alter this principle. As stated in Couch 
on Insurance, 2d §82 :2: 
"In order to constitute effective group insur-
ance as to a particular employee, it is, of course, 
necessary to find the existence of all the elements 
essential to any contract of insurance." 
A group insurance plan always establishes certain 
requirements of criteria for participation and the courts 
have consistently held that anyone not satisfying such 
requirements or criteria is not eligible for participation 
and is not covered in the event of loss. For example, in 
Wi/,son v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 
330, 151 S.E.2d 550, it was held that an em-
ployee was not eligible under a group hospital and 
surgical policy in view of the requirement that an em-
ployee must work a minimum number of hours during 
an eligibility quarter of three months in order to be 
eligible for insurance for the subsequent insurance 
quarter of three months. The employee had not worked 
the required number of hours. 
In Burns v. AGC and Local 701, 240 Ore. 95, 400 
P.2d 2, a group insurance contract required a work-
man to maintain a reserve of not less than 100 hours, 
and provided that when the reserve dropped below 100 
hours there was no insurance for the next succeeding 
month, unless the workman elected to keep it in force 
by cash payment. It was held that since the deceased 
workman's reserves had dropped below 100 hours, under 
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the contract the trustees were entitled to treat the 
account a:: inactive. Thus, life insurance was not in 
t'o1 ce at the time the workman was killed and his widow 
could not recover thereon. 
The court in that case remarked: 
"The insurance was never bargained for be-
tween the insurer and the workman, so there is 
no need to consider whether the agreement was, 
or could have been, misleading to a given work-
man. Apparently the contract was not mislead-
ing to the trustees, who acted on the workman's 
behalf. The trustees take the same position in 
this litigation that the insurer takes. \Vhile we 
have no quarrel with the plaintiff's citation of 
authorities which hold that ambiguities in an in-
surance agreement will be liberally construed 
in farnr of the insured, these authorities are be-
side the point in the case before us." 
In Smith v. Connecticut General Life Insurance 
Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 555, 267 N.Y.S. 579, it 
was held that a group life insurance policy which pro-
vided that it would become effective as to any employee 
in active service on any day when he performed on a 
full-time basis at his employer's regular place of em-
ployment the regular duties of his occupation or em-
ployment, never became effective as to an employee who 
was confined in a hospital throughout the relevant 
period. 
The insuring agreement in the present case clearly 
provides that an employee shall "first become insured" 
on the first day of the second calendar month following 
11 
a consecutiYe period of three months or less in wl1id1 
he had worked at least ;300 hours. had 
not worked the 300 hours until shortly before his dca th. 
IIe had never become insured under the progLtm and 
Lad no benefits due him from the defc11clants. 
In his brief plaintiff argues that there was a waiYer 
by the defendants as to the effectiYc date of insma11ce. 
He "finds-' this waiver in an additional proYision of 
the Certificate-Booklet (H. 9, p. o). 
"If you are not in active regular employment 
on account of i11j ury or sickness on the cla te your 
insurance would have become effectiYe as indi-
cated above, your insurance will become etfecti,-c 
on the date vou return to full-time work or 
ability for except that if >·ou become dis-
abled while actiYelv at work between the date 
on which you complete the necessar>· hours for 
eligibility and the date your eligibility actually 
begins, your insurance will take effect as irnli-
ca,ted above." 
How such language could co11stitute a waivei· of 
the earlier provision is difficult tu understaud. All it 
does is postpone the effective date of the coyerage if 
the employee is not in regular employment because of 
injury or sickness on the date it would otherwise become 
effective, except where the employee's disability is sus-
tained on the job. In the latter case, the insurance 
effect the same day as if the employee had continued 
working. It is true, that in the present case if :\Ir . 
. Marriot had sun-ived until after Nov. I, and then sue-
cumbed from the injuries he "·mild probably have 
12 
been entitled to the life insurance benefits. \Vhile 
it may appear that such result is anomolous or 
111equitable, nonetheless it is compelled by the explicit 
agreement of the parties. Moreover, it must be recog-
nized that in group contracts particularly, there must 
be some standard provision controlling the effective 
elate of the coverage as to each employee. \Vhen the 
effeetive date is clearly and expressly set forth it cannot 
be altered merely because the result, as to one employee, 
may seem to be inequitable. Under the construction 
contended for by plaintiff, the language "each em-
ployee who meets this requirement * * * shall first be-
come insured on the first day of the second calendar 
month next following such period" would have to have 
been omitted, but it was not and it must be given its 
ordinary meaning. 
Plaintiff, in this connection, attempts to invoke the 
rule set forth in Section 302 of the Restatement of 
Contracts. That rule, however, is not applicable to the 
circumstances of the present case as is amply shown 
by the illustrations thereunder. 
Plaintiff's additional argument that there should 
have been a fifth basis for termination of insurance 
does not appear persuasive. \Ve are not dealing with 
termination, as the insurance had never gone into effect 
as to .Mr. Marriot. 
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II 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE lXSLlL\.:\'CJ·, 
CONTRACT AS TO ITS EFFECT!\' E DATE 
OF COVERAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE, lS :\f OT 
AMBIGUOUS AND THERE IS NO BASIS 
FOR IT TO BE CONSTRUED AGAIN ST THE 
INSURERS. 
Defendants have no quarrel with plaintiffs argu-
ment that ambiguities in an insurance contract will 
generally be construed in favor of the insured. HowcYcr, 
the principle has no application in the present case. 
The language of the contract, construed in any reason-
able manner, is not ambiguous. Plaintiff's only cm1-
tention concerning ambiguity relates to whether the 
term "disabled" as used in the section on qualification 
(R. 91, p. 6) could be construed to include death. But 
it is quite universally held that the term "disability" 
or "disabled" in an insurance contract does not include 
death. As stated in Couch on Insurance, 2d S53.4, 
page 25: 
"'Vhile in a practical sense death is the most 
disabling of all disabilities, it is clear that for 
the purpose of an insurance policy 'disability' 
and its numerous variant phrases are used in the 
sense which requires the coutinuancc of an in-
sured's life. Conversely, death is confined to the 
life insurance aspect of the contract and is not 
regarded as coming within the disability con'r-
age. Thus it is generally held that no liability 
for death arises under a policy prcn-iding for 
14 
indemnity to the insured in case of permanent 
cir total disability. 
"Neither is death a 'disability' within the mean-
ing of a policy providing for weekly indemnity 
in the case of accidental injury of an insured 
resulting in total disability to transact a business 
of his occupation." (Emphasis added). 
In 44 Am. J ur. 2d Insurance, § 1595, it is said: 
"From the very nature of the insurance in-
rnlved, it is clear and it is generally held that 
no liability for death arises under a policy pro-
Yision for indemnity to the insured in case of 
permanent or total disability." 
:.l\IoreoYer, to hold that the word "disabled" in the 
section under qualification includes "death" would 
create a highly anomalous and unintended result. Under 
the insurance contract, the parties have agreed that Mr. 
Marriot (and all other members) would not become 
insured and entitled to life insurance and accidental 
death benefits until the first day of the second month 
following completion of 300 hours work. He had no 
insurance for death until after that date. To argue 
that if he died before that date he could nevertheless 
be covered for such benefits results in an obvious non 
sequiter. The proYision under "qualification" is clear 
and unambiguous. All that it does is postpone coverage 
where the employee is not in active regular employment 
because of injury or sickness except when he is injured 
on the job. EYen if Mr. Marriot had only been dis-
abled, he would not have had any insurance benefits 
15 
to cover the disability except those that occurred after 
November 1, 1964. 
Plaintiff states that the language should be giYeu 
a rational and practical construction. Defendants agrc::e 
but submit that the only rational and practical con-
struction is the one stated above. the insur-
ance was not purchased or bargained for by .Mr . .Mar-
riot. It was obtained by the trustees who take the same 
position as the insurers. Thus, the argument that .:\Ir. 
Marriot should be given the insurance he thought he 
was purchasing does not apply. See Burns v. AGC wul 
Local 701, supra. 
Plaintiff argues that it would be contrary to public 
policy to "void the insurance under the terms of the 
coverage which they had written." This, however, m·er-
looks the fact that there had been no insurance for Mr. 
Marriot to void. There was merely an agreement that 
the insurance would take effect on a date which had 
not arrived when Mr. Marriot lost his life. Such a pro-
vision is absolutely necessary in a group insurance policy 
where participants are being added and dropped at 
intervals as they become eligible for the insurance. As 
shown under Point I above, the courts give effect to 
such provisions and there is nothing contrary to public 
policy about them. Certainly there is nothing unreason-
able about the provision. Plaintiff's argument as to 
what the result might have been had Mr. been 
fired and entitled to conversion privileges has no bearing 
upon what actually happened in the present case. Cer-
16 
tainly the results might have been different if other 
'.hir..gs had happened but they didn't. His statement 
that to find against .Mr. Marriot would make it impos-
sible for a person who was killed on the job to avoid 
forfeiture of all his rights is just not correct. Had he 
been killed after his coverage went into effect there is 
no doubt that he would have been covered, but he cannot 
be covered under a policy which had not gone into 
effect. 
Plaintiff, citing 1lletropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Evans, 189 S.E. 369 (Ga., 1936), argues that 
at most the effective date (of November 1, 1964) should 
set the date when the benefits could be collected even 
though the event happened prior to that time. In the 
Evans case, it was held that even though the accident 
happened prior to the expiration of one year, total and 
permanent disability may not have arisen until after 
the policy had been in effect for one year, since total 
disability is a question of fact. Here, however, we are 
dealing with death. There is absolutely no question 
that this occurred prior to the effective date of the 
insurance. Other cases cited by plaintiff clearly are not 
in point, nor are the sections of the insurance code cited 
by him (§31-23-15, 16, 17). 
Also, plaintiff complains of the matter being de-
cided by summary judgment, and states that there 
should be "the usual prerogative of either party to re-
quest a trial by jury. In the present case plaintiff as 
well as the defendants moved for summary judgment. 
17 
There was clearly no dispute as to any material fact. 
The question decided is one of law. Summary judg-
ment was entirely proper and under the circumstances 
could only have been granted in favor of defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The insurance contract obtained by the union for 
the benefit of its employees clearly and unambiguously 
provides that the insurance does not become effectin 
as to a particular employee until the first day of the 
second month after the employee has become eligible. 
To become eligible an employee must work 300 hours 
in three or less consecutive months for a contributing 
employer. The evidence is undisputed that l\Ir .. 
had not become eligible until the middle of September, 
shortly before he died. The insurance would not have 
become effective until November l, 1964!, and there 
was no life inurance or accidental death coverage at 
the time of his death. There are no ambiguities in any 
pertinent provision of the insurance contract to be con-
strued against the insurers and no waiver by them of 
the provisions as to the effective death of coverage. 
Although one can sympathize with l\Ir. l\Iarriot's 
heirs, the language of the contract is binding and must 
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